How to study adaptation (and why to do it that way) by Olson, Mark E. & Arroyo-Santos, Alfonso
1 
 
HOW TO STUDY ADAPTATION AND WHY TO DO IT THAT WAY: ADAPTATION, 
JUST SO STORIES, AND CIRCULARITY 
 
MARK E. OLSON 
Instituto de Biología, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Tercer Circuito s/n de Ciudad 
Universitaria, México DF 04510, Mexico 
E-MAIL: MOLSON@IB.UNAM.MX 
 
ALFONSO ARROYO-SANTOS 
Centro de Información Geoprospectiva, Berlín 29A, Del Carmen Coyoacán, México DF 04100, 
Mexico and Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 
Circuito Interior s/n de Ciudad Universitaria, México DF 04510, Mexico  
E-MAIL: AGRIPAS@GMAIL.COM 
 
ABSTRACT 
Some adaptationist explanations are regarded as maximally solid and others fanciful just-so 
stories. Just-so stories are explanations based on very little evidence. Lack of evidence leads to 
circular-sounding reasoning: “this trait was shaped by selection in unseen ancestral populations 
and this selection must have occurred because the trait is present.” Well-supported adaptationist 
explanations include evidence that is not only abundant but selected from comparative, 
populational, and optimality perspectives, the three adaptationist subdisciplines. Each 
subdiscipline obtains its broad relevance in evolutionary biology via assumptions that can only 
be tested with the methods of the other subdisciplines. However, even in the best-supported 
explanations, assumptions regarding variation, heritability, and fitness in unseen ancestral 
populations are always present. These assumptions are accepted given how well they would 
explain the data if they were true. This means that some degree of “circularity” is present in all 
evolutionary explanations. Evolutionary explanation corresponds not to a deductive structure, as 
biologists usually assert, but instead to ones such as abduction or induction. With these structures 
in mind, we show the way to a healthier view of “circularity” in evolutionary biology, and why 
integration across the comparative, populational, and optimality approaches is necessary. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Some inferences of adaptation are accepted as solid, almost without question. Many are 
dismissed as just-so stories, while others are accused of being riddled with circularity. Here we 
outline the difference between a just-so story and a solid, widely accepted adaptationist 
explanation. We also examine the “circularity” that is so often criticized in evolutionary biology, 
why it is there, and the important part it plays in all evolutionary explanations. We show that the 
difference between a just-so story and a well-accepted adaptationist explanation is the amount of 
direct evidence available. Like all attempts to infer things about the deep past, adaptationist 
explanations are most trusted when they have a lot of evidence from a diversity of sources. That 
more evidence is better is obvious. Not so obvious is that some strategies for getting this 
information are better than others. Even less obvious is that some degree of “circularity” is 
necessarily present in all adaptationist explanations, no matter how well supported. This 
circularity can be thought of in terms of inference types such as induction, abduction or in 
popular statistical methods such as Bayesianism. Whatever the name of inference type applied, 
the need for a diversity of evidence leads us to conclude by calling for integration across the 
adaptationist subdisciplines. We start by exploring “just-so stories” and the three main 
adaptationist strategies, before turning how to structure maximally supported explanations of the 
striking fit between form and funtion across the living world. 
  
JUST-SO STORIES 
Adaptationist scenarios are often criticized as “just-so stories.” The term comes from the title of 
Rudyard Kipling’s 1902 children’s book of origin stories. In the context of adaptation, it is a 
derogatory term, implying that a given adaptationist explanation is unfalsifiable, fanciful, and is 
accepted not because of evidence but based on plausibility alone (Lennox 1991; Durrant and 
Haig 2001). Reference to Kipling and just-so stories is often attributed to Gould and Lewontin’s 
1979 Spandrels paper (Alcock 1998 (as Gould and Lewontin 1981); Hull 2001; Hall 2002; 
Travis 2003 (as Gould and Lewontin 1970); Sosis 2009; Frost-Arnold 2010 (as Gould and 
Lewontin 1978)), even by Gould himself (1997, 2002). However, the Spandrels paper makes no 
mention of Kipling and does not use the “just-so story” term, though other essays by Gould 
(1977, 1978, 1997, and 2002) do. Just-so stories are of interest here because they help explore 
how an adaptationist explanation that is little trusted is constructed, and thus show the way to 
one that is regarded as solid.  
Adaptationist just-so stories are criticized for two reasons, one being “circularity” and the 
other their freedom to proliferate. Just-so stories are criticized for “circularity” because the 
presence of a given trait in current organisms is used as the sole evidence to infer heritable 
variation in the trait in an ancestral population and a selective regime that favored some variants 
over others. This unobserved selective scenario explains the presence of the observed trait, and 
the only evidence for the selective scenario is trait presence (e.g. Griffiths 1996; Frost-Arnold 
2010). Gould (1996) called the giraffe’s neck the “canonical just-so story” because the story is so 
often repeated. The story consists of the notion that selection favored variants with relatively 
long necks in short-necked ancestral giraffe populations as a result of their greater ability to 
obtain food. Giraffe necks are long as a result of this unobservable selection on heritable 
ancestral variation in neck length, and this selection must have occurred because giraffe necks 
are long and because giraffes today do eat leaves from tall trees (Figure 1). The relative lack of 
information that leads to this “circular” structure also allows different potential explanations to 
proliferate. 
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Multiple accounts of selection in the distant past can be devised to explain the presence 
of any trait. In the absence of information beyond simple trait presence, it is hard to choose the 
best from among these alternative accounts. For example, the long neck of the giraffe might have 
been favored in reaching high leaves. Alternatively, perhaps males with longer necks prevailed 
in battles for females; perhaps long necks in males developmentally imply long ones in females, 
and so all giraffes have long necks. Based only on the trait “long neck” and that the necks are 
involved in reaching high leaves as well as in male-male battles, it is hard to pick one or the 
other of these explanations as the best one (Gould 1996; Simmons and Scheepers 1996). When 
the available data are unable to distinguish convincingly between two or more hypotheses, the 
hypotheses are said to be underdetermined by the data (Ladyman 2002; Dietrich and Skipper 
2007). The literature on adaptation is full of examples of underdetermination (Forber 2009). For 
example, carrion flowers might have been favored in an environment with a dearth of bees and 
an abundance of flies. But herbivores are apparently driven away by the scent of rotting flesh, so 
maybe stinky flowers are instead an herbivore deterrent (Lev-Yadun et al. 2009). The colorful 
peeling bark of tropical trees in many plant families has been seen as an adaptation permitting 
photosynthesis of the living bark (Franco-Vizcaíno et al. 1990), a mechanism to shed epiphytes 
and thereby reduce mechanical loads (Stevens 1987), or even as a attractant of fruit dispersers 
(McVaugh and Rzedowski 1965). MacColl (2010) details no less than six underdetermined 
adaptive explanations for the armor plates of sticklebacks. Evidence beyond simple trait presence 
is needed to choose between hypotheses and to minimize the “circularity” of just-so 
explanations. But some strategies for gathering evidence are better than others. To see why, it is 
necessary first to examine the three main adaptationist approaches. 
 
“CIRCULARITY” AND THE THREE ADAPTATIONIST SUBDISCIPLINES 
Approaches for studying adaptation fall into three disciplinary categories: comparative, 
populational, and optimality. Just-so stories, understood as “circular” arguments with little direct 
evidence, can be found in all of these approaches. The intent of this section is to describe the 
generalities of each of the three approaches briefly, to be able to examine how each is associated 
with “circularity” when little direct evidence is available. After, we will show that some 
“circularity” is in fact natural and necessary in all explanations involving adaptation, hence our 
scare quotes. Importantly, we show that the assumptions being accepted using “circular” 
reasoning are those that give each approach its broad relevance in evolutionary biology. We then 
illustrate how to construct more robust adaptive explanations by simultaneous use of the three 
approaches.  
 
THE COMPARATIVE METHOD 
The comparative method detects adaptation through convergence (Losos 2011). A basic version 
of comparative studies, perhaps the one underpinning most statements about adaptation, is the 
qualitative observation of similar organismal features in similar selective contexts. An example 
is the observation that aquatic animals often have streamlined shapes and fins, regardless of 
whether they are fish, whales, icthyosaurs, eurypterids, or squids. Convergence thinking finds a 
quantitative expression in methods that seek statistical relationships in cross-species data (Bell 
1989; Martins 2000; Blomberg et al. 2003). These include both studies of how organismal 
attributes change predictably across environmental gradients, such as the global negative 
relationship between the toothiness of plant leaves and temperature (Peppe et al. 2011), as well 
as between organismal attributes, such as bone length-diameter scaling (Christiansen 1999; 
Swartz and Middleton 2008; Kilbourne and Mackovicky 2012). Other examples of comparative 
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approaches include those that aim to detect deviations from neutral substitution patterns in 
multiple molecular alignments (Nielsen 2009). Across this methodological diversity, the use of 
cross-species variation unites all comparative methods.  
It is easy to construct “circular” just-so stories based on comparative data. These 
“circular” stories anchor comparative methods as a fundamental source of information for 
constructing evolutionary explanations. If the pattern in Figure 2 is regarded as reflecting 
adaptation, then it is implied that the occupied part of the plot corresponds to combinations of X 
and Y that are of higher fitness than the surrounding space (Arnold 2005). This view effectively 
asserts that “this space is filled in nature; because selection favors variants with high fitness, this 
space must be of high fitness. I know that this is the space corresponding to high fitness, because 
it is filled” (Figure 2).  
Without assumptions regarding evolutionary process, comparative data would be no more 
than blank descriptions of how trait values are distributed. Assumptions about population level 
phenomena such as developmentally possible variation, heritability, and fitness, are the vital glue 
that connect comparative patterns to notions of evolutionary process and thereby give 
comparative patterns relevance beyond simple description (Table 1). However, based on the 
pattern in Figure 2 alone, any adaptive explanation is rightly considered a just-so story in that it 
is hard to choose the adaptationist scenario over other potential explanations. For example, the 
pattern might be observed because the empty spaces are developmental impossibilities, even 
though they would be of much higher fitness than the observed morphologies (Olson 2012). The 
pattern might be due to drift or other chance alignments (Brandon and Fleming 2014). Based on 
the pattern in Figure 2 alone, all of these explanations will all have the “circular” structure shown 
there. Similar things happen with the other adaptationist approaches.  
 
POPULATIONAL APPROACHES 
Another approach for studying adaptation focuses on the population level. Populational 
approaches include a wide range of tools for testing hypotheses of adaptation, from detailed 
studies of reproductive biology or intrapopulational variation to quantitative genetics (e.g. Lande 
and Arnold 1983; Bell 2008; Olson 2012). These studies reason that because natural selection 
acts on interindividual variation, the population level is the domain appropriate for studying 
adaptation. These studies focus directly on variation, heritability, and fitness between potentially 
competing individuals. In a particularly complete study, Travers et al. (2003) documented 
variation in the curvature of floral nectar spurs in populations of the jewelweed Impatiens 
capensis. They found that the spurs, tubular projections from the backs of the flowers that attract 
pollinators with sugary nectar, varied in projecting almost straight back to almost completely 
recurved, with the tip facing the front of the flower. For a trait to be subject to selection, 
variation must be heritable, and many techniques are available for estimating the degree to which 
offspring tend to resemble their parents in a given trait. Travers et al. (2003) estimated 
heritability using a selfing protocol followed by a regression of progeny spur curvature on 
parental curvature. They found a marked tendency for parental curvature to predict progeny 
curvature. In addition to being heritable, a trait subject to selection must be associated with 
differences in fitness. Travers et al. (2003) studied the way that different spur curvatures resulted 
in different hummingbird visitation times. They found that flowers with more recurved spurs 
were associated with longer visitation times and more grains of pollen carried away. That spur 
curvature is heritable and associated with differential reproductive success is compatible with the 
hypothesis that curvature can be subject to selection and that some predictable patterns of 
variation in curvature could be adaptive.  
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As compared to comparative approaches, populational methods invoke a different but 
equally important set of “circular” assumptions. Like comparative methods, these assumptions 
also have to do with the fundamental justification that gives populational methods their general 
relevance in evolutionary biology. Populational methods are detailed studies of very 
geographically and temporally restricted sets of organisms under often unusual situations, e.g. 
purebred lines, over short times. This approach is of direct importance mostly to applied 
activities like plant or animal breeding, in which humans wish to produce a given selective 
response in a given time. The relevance of populational studies to evolutionary biology at large is 
only via the assumption that population-level processes identical to those being studied in fact 
play important roles in generating the patterns of trait distribution observed over geological time 
and across clades (Table 1). This assumption is exactly the one invoked in forging the link 
between the fossil record and population genetics of the Modern Synthesis (e.g. Simpson 1953). 
In this way, the great just-so story of population biology is that very local population-level 
phenomena are in some way isomorphic with the factors shaping life on earth at large. In 
populational studies, “circularity” takes the form that heritable variation with fitness 
consequences shaping local situations is taken as an explanation of the organismal form-function 
fit globally, and the form-function fit is taken as confirming population level selection as the 
shaping factor. Based only on population-level data, this assumption is as much a just-so story as 
the unobserved variation and fitness in the comparative example above (Figure 2). Missing from 
both the comparative and populational approaches are explicit notions of the biophysical reasons 
behind a given variant being favored, information provided by the optimality perspective. 
 
OPTIMALITY MODELING 
Optimality methods examine the ways that performance or fitness differences emerge as the 
result of predictable biophysical principles. For example, fluid mechanics can be applied to study 
the morphology of fish. Because as they swim fish ram their heads through the water, pressure is 
positive there, but it becomes negative along their flanks. In between the sites of positive and 
negative pressure there is an area of relatively neutral pressure. Because a fish’s vision could be 
affected if its eye is distorted by negative or positive pressure, selection would be predicted to 
favor individuals with eyes positioned at this neutral point. This it seems to do (Dubois et al. 
1973; Vogel 2003). Predicting the optimal position for eyes can take into account not only the 
distribution of pressures about the body but also features such as the minimization of distance to 
the brain or the maintenance of a given visual field. Given a series of competing considerations, 
optimality models predict the combination or combinations that maximize fitness or some other 
performance criterion (Parker and Maynard-Smith 1990; Vincent and Brown 2005; Potochnik 
2009). In the fish eye case, the performance criterion corresponds to undistorted vision. 
Coincidence between optimality predictions and nature by chance and not via the action of 
selection seems very unlikely.  
However unlikely that model-nature coincidence not be the result of selection, 
explanations built only on optimality models also involve “circular” acceptance of assumptions 
(Griffiths 1996). Coincidence between optimality predictions and nature that are due to chance or 
any other non-adaptive process is regarded as so unlikely that the trait must be due to selection 
(Orzack and Sober 1994). Based only on coincidence between nature and model, an adaptationist 
explanation takes the form that the there is coincidence between model and nature, implies 
selection; this unobserved selection in turn explains why there is coincidence between the model 
and nature. As we will show, this sort of “circularity” can be minimized but never eliminated. 
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ADAPTATIONISM: A VIRTUOUS CIRCULARITY 
Whether comparative, populational, or optimality, all approaches for studying adaptation have 
built-in “circular” assumptions, and these assumptions are the ones that justify each method as 
being of evolutionary relevance (Table 1). Without these assumptions, each of these methods 
produces only descriptive accounts of very limited local interest. When combined, an 
adaptationist explanation that includes comparative, populational, and optimality data is always 
considered well-supported and much more than a just-so story. As we will show, though, even 
the best-supported explanation still involves “circularity.” 
While “loops” of reasoning are easy to detect in the just-so examples in Figures 2 and 
3A, they are still present even in the best-supported studies of adaptation (Figure 3B). If a given 
pattern has an adaptive cause then by definition at some time in the past, not just the observable 
present or moments captured in fossil traces, heritable variation with fitness consequences was 
present (Leroi et al. 1994; Forber and Griffith 2011). Selection on this variation is assumed to 
have led to the pattern observed today (Figure 3B). All adaptationist explanations at some point 
invoke and accept these assumptions about unseen and unexaminable sets of organisms. That 
almost all swimming organisms have streamlined bodies and fins certainly suggests that these 
features are adaptive. Their being adaptive means that in some ancestral population there was 
variation leading to differential survivorship and reproduction (Scriven 1959). These populations 
will never be seen, but that they must have existed is accepted because their having existed 
would explain the data so well if it were true (Figure 3). As more direct evidence is gathered 
(from Figures 3A to 3B), the relative importance of “circular” loops diminishes. But no matter 
how much direct evidence is accumulated or what method is used, the existence of unseen 
populations is assumed. That traits today are distributed the way that they are suggests that these 
populations must have existed, and the assumed existence of these populations helps explain why 
traits are distributed the way that they are. This apparent “circularity” is what we mean by 
“loopy” (cf. Rieppel 2003). “Loopiness” does not undermine the solidity of reasoning regarding 
adaptation. Because so much information is available from so many different sources, the notion 
that fins in aquatic ones seem as solid an assertion as can be hoped for in science (Figure 4).  
In fact, scientific explanations in general, not just evolutionary ones, have a loopy 
structure. This example from astronomy is an excellent  example of loopy reasoning: “The 
transmission spectrum of the super-Earth exoplanet GJ 1214b is observed to be featureless at 
near-infrared wavelengths and its atmosphere must contain clouds to be consistent with the data” 
(Kreidberg et al. 2014 p. 69). The assumption that the planet has clouds is accepted because it 
would explain the data best if it were true. The featureless near-infrared transmission spectrum is 
observed because there are clouds; there must be clouds because of the featureless spectrum. The 
authors marshal other layers of direct evidence in favor of their interpretation of a cloudy planet, 
building an explanatory structure exactly analogous to that in Figure 3B, loops and all.  
Loopiness is well documented by philosophers of biology. Griffiths’s (1996) 
“adaptationist abduction” (see also Ruse 1975; Sterelny and Griffiths 1999; Durrant and Haig 
2001) is an account of “loopy” reasoning in terms of an inferential strategy known as abduction 
or inference to the best explanation (Lipton 2008). Griffiths’s account maps the “loops” of 
reasoning that optimality studies use to construct adaptationist explanations. The notion of 
abduction was introduced by Charles Sanders Peirce in 1903 as a type of inference of the form  
 
The fact C is observed; 
If A were true, C would be a matter of course, 
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. 
7 
 
 
The assumption A is accepted because it would explain the data so well if it were true, exactly 
the way assumptions are accepted in Figure 3. ifferent authors have proposed epistemic and 
quantitative criteria for evaluating abductive statements (for a review see Douven 2011; also 
Scriven 1959), but whatever way that abductive statements are judged, they involve “loopy” 
interplay between the phenomenon to be explained and the explanation itself. This interplay, in 
the form of assumptions that are accepted as a function of how well they would explain the data 
if they were true, is precisely how explanations in evolutionary biology are constructed (Haig 
and Durrant 2002; Ladyman 2002 offers a friendly introduction to inference types). Abduction is 
a form of reasoning that corresponds well to the way that studies of adaptation are genuinely 
carried out, but it is by no means the only one.  
Loopiness can also be found in familiar statistical procedures. For example, the essence 
of Bayesian statistical methods is that confidence in a given hypothesis is strengthened in the 
light of new evidence. In Bayesianism, the probabilities involved are read as a measure of belief 
in a given hypothesis. Evidence allows scientists to confirm or disconfirm the belief they have in 
the hypothesis (Table 2; Fisher 1985; Okasha 2000). With its back-and forth relation between the 
posterior probability, the priors, and the hypotheses under consideration, Bayesian reasoning is 
an excellent example of loopy reasoning.  
Our proposal to embrace “loopiness” is motivated not so much by the need to tag 
adaptationist reasoning as “abductive,” “Bayesian,” or any other term, but because this 
recognition shows how to make evolutionary explanations stronger. We have tried to show that 
the construction of scientific explanations is “loopy” by arguing first and foremost from common 
sense biological practice. The aim in the present section was to show briefly that this take is not 
just our personal view. Instead, loopiness is old news in the philosophy of science. It is news, 
though, to most biologists, and therefore has important consequences for everyday biological 
practice. At this point, based on the reasoning above and their own experience, many biologists 
will be convinced that evolutionary explanations are built with a loopy structure and will want to 
know what this means for the study of adaptation. They can safely skip the next section. Others 
will be left wondering why evolutionary biologists spend so much time saying that their science 
is deductive, non-loopy, and even Popperian. The next section gives a little more detail for these 
readers.  
 
FIVE MYTHS OF HYPOTHETICO- DEDUCTIVE EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 
The arguments above contradict more than 50 years of biological tradition. Evolutionary biology 
has a longstanding custom of regarding all forms of “circularity” with suspicion, rejecting 
“induction,” and affirming biology’s deductive, Popperian, and falsificationist nature. In fact, 
like science in general, evolutionary biology is neither deductive nor Popperian. Induction and 
“circularity” in the loopy sense we use here are the not the bad words biologists traditionally 
make them out to be. Terms like “hypothetico-deductive” and “falsificationism” imply very 
different things in biology than they do in the philosophy of science. Because these traditional 
positions of biologists might cause resistance in accepting “loopiness,” in this section, we give 
some additional detail. Because these notions are pervasive in biology and confusing, we give 
some order by treating them as five “myths” of hypothetico-deductive evolutionary biology. 
 
Myth 1: Deduction is the standard of good science. The importance of deduction versus loopy 
thinking has had two different trajectories in the philosophy of science and in biology. The 
deductive vision of science has been controversial in the philosophy of science since the birth of 
8 
 
the field in the early 20th century with the Vienna Circle. The Vienna circle was formed by a 
group of philosophers also called logical positivists (Uebel 2007). Despite some diversity in their 
ranks regarding their view of what science ought to be, logical positivists have come to be 
regarded as defenders of a deductive vision of science. This vision had its crowning moment 
with the deductive-nomological model (DN model) developed by Carl Hempel and Paul 
Oppenheim in the late 1940s. The “deductive” part of the DN model specified that scientific 
explanations are deductive arguments in which the phenomenon to be explained, called the 
explanadum, is the logical consequence of a set of premises, called the explanans. The 
“nomological” aspect of the DN model said that the explanans must contain at least one law of 
nature, nomos being Greek for “law”. The DN model was criticized from the outset. Not all 
philosophers of the time believed that all of science could really be fit into a deductive mold. In 
addition, it is not entirely clear what a “law of nature” actually is, or how to tell one from a 
generalization or a model. Another criticism was that perfectly valid deductions can result in 
perfectly invalid explanations, e.g. the conclusion that the height of a flagpole is caused by its 
shadow (see Bromberger 1966). As a result, philosophers got over the notion that science has to 
be entirely deductive quite quickly (see for example Scriven 1959, Salmon 1989, Ladyman 
2002). In the ensuing decades, the DN model has been replaced by a consensus viewing 
scientific explanations as “loopy” (Salmon et al., Sober 2008), not deductive.  
To show that studying adaptation cannot be a deductive enterprise, we can compare 
“loopy” explanations with what we will call “pattern” explanations. Pattern explanations are 
considered correct if they conform to a particular structure, or pattern (Nagel 1961; Schaffner 
1993; Strevens 2009). This is the case of deductive explanations, which must conform to a 
pattern given by the rules of formal logic. If an argument conforms to such a pattern, then it is 
certain that its conclusion is correct (see for example Hempel 1965). In contrast to loopy ones, 
explanations built on deduction do not shore up faith in the underlying assumptions. For 
example, in the addition of 1+1, the conclusion of “2” does not increase confidence in definitions 
of what “1” and “+” mean. In real life studies of adaptation, instead of deductive certainties and 
ineluctable laws there are at best statistical probabilities and likelihoods (e.g. Scriven 1959; Ruse 
1975; Rieppel 2003). Moreover, in adaptationist studies, faith in assumptions is a function of 
how well they explain the data (see Lipton 2008). For example, this quote from Darwin could be 
a textbook illustration of “loopy” acceptance of assumptions given their ability to explain the 
data: “It can hardly be supposed that a false theory would explain, in so satisfactory a manner as 
does the theory of natural selection, the several large classes of facts above specified” (Darwin p. 
471 6th edition of the Origin). Explanations involving adaptation are thus not deductive, but 
instead "loopy" ones (Figure 3).  
Even though biology cannot be deductive, in the late 1960s biologists began a firm 
tradition of describing their procedures as “deductive” and stuck with it to the present day. Some 
prominent examples include Ghiselin (1966) and Medawar (1967), both of whom persuasively 
stated again and again that biology is built on deduction (Medawar 1967). Their approach was 
mirrored exactly by Mayr in his influential 1982 Growth of Biological Thought. Gould (1980) 
even entitled a paper stating the aspiration of paleobiology to become a “nomothetic, 
evolutionary discipline.” In the 1984 preface to his 1969 book, Ghiselin said, echoing Hempel 
and Oppenheim, that “Biology…is a hypothetico-deductive, predictive, deterministic, and 
nomothetic science” (p. xiii). These exact arguments are repeated by biologists to the present 
day, perhaps most prominently by Ayala (2009). Thus, in exactly the period in which 
philosophers were acutely seeing the limitations of deductive accounts of science, and looking 
beyond them to “loopy” structures, the tradition of citing deduction was hardening in biology. 
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The position in biology regarding deduction has thus followed a very different trajectory from 
that in the philosophy of science. However, it is clear that explanations in evolutionary biology, 
like science in general, cannot be built entirely on deduction. What, then, of the “hypothetico-
deductive method”? 
 
Myth 2: The hypothetico-deductive method is deductive. Even though biologists very often use 
the term “hypothetico-deductive method,” their use does not really denote a wholly deductive 
method. As used by biologists, this method consists of three steps. The first the generation of a 
hypothesis. In a second, which potentially involves a deductive operation, predictions are 
generated from the hypothesis. Most often, these are of a non-deductive, probabilistic nature, e.g. 
“if X is true, then Y should be common.” The third step involves empirically testing the 
predictions. This step is also not deductive (Table 2). Deciding whether observations conform or 
not to predictions is always a probabilistic effort. While the hypothetico-deductive method does 
describe scientific practice well, it never results in a deductively structured explanation, but 
instead a loopy one. In addition to being not deductive, it is also not Popperian.  
 
Myth 3: Science is Popperian. Following a similarly divergent trajectory as statements about 
deduction, there is a long tradition of biologists saying that what they do is Popperian (Table 3; 
Panchen 1992, Holcomb 1996, Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, Sober 2000, Haig and Durrant 2002, 
Ladyman 2002, Rieppel 2003, Morange 2009, Lancaster 2011). Biologists go to great lengths to 
show that Popper supports one or another position (e.g. Wiley 1975, Platinick and Gaffney 1975, 
Jaksić 1981, de Queiroz and Poe 2003, Ayala 2009, etc.). It is not clear why Popper has been 
made what Ruse 1979 calls a “patron saint of science” (p. 287), but Ruse (1979, 2005) suggests 
that it is the simplicity of Popper’s scheme, that it makes scientists look daring and clever, and 
that it fulfills the desires to see progress in science. These considerations notwithstanding, the 
essence of Popper’s vision was a deductive one, meaning that there is no way that science in 
general and evolutionary biology particular can be Popperian.  
 
Myth 4: Biologists are Popperian falsificationists. Popper’s falsificationist scheme is a deductive 
one. Confirming or falsifying hypotheses correspond to two different rules of deductive 
inference known as modus ponens (latin for "the way that affirms by affirming") and modus 
tollens ("the way that denies by denying"). Modus ponens is the idea that if the condition If P 
then Q is true, and P is the case, then Q must be the case. A well-known example of modus 
ponens is: If it rains then the floor will get wet. It rains, theferefore, the floor wil get wet (see 
TABLE 2). Contrary to modus ponens, modus tollens is the idea that if the condition If P then Q 
is true but Q is not the case, then P cannot be the case. Under modus tollens the previous 
example would be: If it rains then the floor will get wet but given that the floor is not wet, then it 
must be the case that it has not rained. Popper famously said that science proceeds through 
instances of modus tollens, a process he called falsificationism. His idea was that, given that it is 
very difficult to amass enough evidence to make valid inferences via modus ponens, it makes 
more sense to proceed via modus tollens given that positive predictions or confirmations of 
particular instances may be hard to come by but disconfirming hypotheses via experimentation is 
not. Either way, Popper envisioned the use of deduction, never statistics. 
However, most biologists thinking in falsificationist terms use statistics. For example, 
biologists often identify a set of possible explanations and then use statistical tests to exclude 
them one by one to see which one seems to be the best one (e.g. Templeton 2009). These 
statistical operations such as hypothesis testing are probabilistic and by definition non-deductive. 
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For Popper, falsification meant constructing a deductive argument using modus tollens. Because 
statistical null hypothesis testing is not deductive, there is a margin for error. This margin for 
error is quantified via the “statistical significance” of the test in rejecting a given hypothesys. 
Statistical significance thresholds are arbitrary, with the choice of P<0.05 as a threshold for 
significance being one of convention but not salient from nature. These arbitrary thresholds are 
one reason why philosopher Elliot Sober notes that there is “no probabilistic modus tollens” 
(Sober 2008). This means that the procedures that biologists use and call falsification (see e.g. 
Forber 2011), while an important and accepted part of scientific practice, are definitely not 
deductive and definitely not Popperian.  
 
Myth 5: Modern evolutionary biology’s stand against “induction.” In the writings of authors such 
as Ghiselin (1966, 1969), Medawar (1967), through Gould (1980) and Mayr (1982), to Ayala 
(2009), and others, “induction” is presented as the random collection of facts in the hope that a 
universal generality will spring unaided from the data. That this is a caricature is revealed by the 
fact that even these authors admit that no one, in fact, proceeds in this way (e.g. Ghiselin 1969 p. 
4, Gould 1980 p. 97). In reality, an induction is simply an inference whose conclusions are 
associated with some level of error (remember that in deduction, if the premises are true, the 
conclusion is true; see Table 2 for a comparison of inference types; see for example Hull 1973, 
Ladyman 2002). Most of our daily work in biology deals with measuring the strength of 
inductive conclusions using, for example, probabilities. Aware of the fact that most of science 
proceeds through induction, philosophers and mathematicians have long been interested in 
coming up with ‘degrees of certainty’ or ‘likelihood functions’ to quantify the relation between 
our evidence and its underlying hypotheses (see Popper 1959; Hacking 1976; Sober 1988; de 
Queiroz and Poe 2001).  Loopy reasoning is usually regarded as a type of induction. This means 
that “induction” is not the ingenuous “idyll” (Gould 1980) that so many authors have made it out 
to be. Instead, non-deductive, loopy procedures are the heart and soul of science. 
 
To summarize, these “myths” illustrate five important points that cause confusion regarding the 
role of deduction in evolutionary biology. 1. The idea that science is deductive has been 
contested in philosophy of science since early on, but continues, incorrectly, to receive lip 
service in biology to this day. 2. Much of this lip service is in the form of references to the 
“hypothetico-deductive method.” In biology this simply means generating hypotheses, deriving 
predictions from these hypotheses, and testing them. It does not correspond a purely deductive 
approach. 3. Popper’s scheme was a deductive one; science in general and e-bio in particular, are 
loopy and so cannot be Popperian. 4. Falsification in biololgy is not Popperian because what 
biologists call “falsification” is statistical and not the deductive procedure that Popper stipulated. 
5. Induction is not random data collection, but instead a type of inference in which the 
conclusion is associated with some uncertainty, like practically all operations in real science. 
Even though biologists say that biology is deductive and Popperian, when they describe 
how scientists work they usually accurately describe actual biological practice, loops and all. It 
could be argued that there is no real problem if biologists simply apply the wrong name to loopy 
procedures. But biologists really do accuse each other of “circularity” in the context of legitimate 
“loopy” explanations (Table Circ). A lack of appreciation of loopiness is the only condition that 
could permit taking the “tautology” of the theory of natural selection seriously for so long in 
evolutionary biology (taut cites). The debate regarding adaptationism (e.g. Gould and Lewontin 
1979) could only have continued so long because practitioners of comparative, populational, and 
optimality methods work in isolation. This isolation, in turn, can only exist if biologists regard 
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their parochial approaches as sufficient for studying adaptation. These are all aspects that are 
encouraged by the misapplied “deduction” label. It is time to for biologists to recognize and 
value the true, “loopy” structure of scientific explanations. It is time to recognize the 
complementary nature of the data the three adaptationist approaches generate, and it is time to 
forge true cooperation across comparative, populational, and optimality perspectives.  
 
HOW TO STUDY ADAPTATION: THE VITAL COMPLEMENTARITY OF COMPARATIVE, POPULATIONAL, 
AND OPTIMALITY APPROACHES 
Though there is no conceptual reason to do so, populational and comparative biologists tend to 
work in isolation and even deride each other (Oakley 2010). Quantitative geneticists can be 
heard accusing their comparative biologist colleagues of being guilty of studying fitness by 
‘intuition and clairvoyance.’ Comparative biologists concede that quantitative genetic studies 
may be interesting for their detail but note that they can only focus on traits ‘so trivial’ that they 
have not gone to fixation—surely the aim of evolutionary biology is to account for the great 
patterns of trait variation across all of life, and not just inconsequential local variation. As for 
studies of adaptation from the optimality modeling perspective, they are caricatured as the 
ingenuous view of inexorable progress to the best of all possible solutions. The result of this 
mutual hostility is that for the most part, proponents of comparative, populational, and optimality 
approaches work separately (Hadfield and Nakagawa 2010; Oakley 2010; cf. Parker and 
Maynard-Smith 1990; Harvey and Pagel 1991; Falconer and Mackay 1996). Amid this general 
separation, biologists do occasionally call for integration (e.g. Fisher 1985; Endler 1986; Wake 
and Larson 1987; Leroi et al. 1994; Durrant and Haig 2001; Matos et al. 2004). 
For example, Larson and Losos (1996) proposed a procedure for testing adaptive 
hypotheses integrating various layers of direct evidence. Their methodology involves a series of 
steps sequentially examining trait heritability, trait individuality/quasi-independence, restricted 
versus ample developmental potential, and comparisons of ancestral versus contemporary 
selective regimes, as well as documenting the relative performance of variants. Recognizing the 
“loopy” nature of adaptive explanations makes clear why schemes that integrate multiple lines of 
evidence generate satisfying results (Figure 3).  
Integration provides satisfying results because, rather than being in competition with one 
another, the methods in fact provide equally important aspects of the adaptation puzzle, aspects 
that are moreover complementary (Table 5). They are complementary because important 
evidence not provided by one method is provided by the others (Table 1, Figure 3). Comparative 
methods are the only ones that address the true products of real evolutionary diversification in 
the wild, on evolutionarily relevant time scales beyond the ecological moment. However, the 
comparative method leaves unexamined the details of heritability, variation, and fitness, details 
that only populational methods can address. In addition, which variant has higher fitness should 
be predictable given considerations of biomechanical performance or energetic efficiency. The 
only method that examines this aspect directly is the optimality approach. All of these aspects, 
including the patterns of trait distribution across clades and continents, population-level process, 
and optimality considerations, are essential for a maximally supported adaptationist explanation 
(summarized in Table 5). Intensive studies from just one of these points of view cannot provide 
all of the layers of direct evidence needed to diminish the relative importance of loops of 
“circular” reasoning caused by acceptance of assumptions about the unobservable past (Figures 
3, 4; Griffiths 1996; see also Figure 3 of Ruse 1975). The shortcomings of each method are 
almost perfectly filled by the strengths of the others (cf. Forber and Griffith 2011, Ghiselin 
1969[p 21]). As a result, the best-supported adaptationist explanations have not just an 
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abundance of information, but information carefully drawn from across the three adaptationist 
approaches.  
Recognizing that adaptationist explanations require evidence from comparative, 
populational, and optimality approaches to be maximally supported helps explain why some 
adaptive studies that biologists would like to make are particularly sticky. Studies of single 
species or unique structures are an important example. Such traits can't be studied using 
comparative approaches, because the putatively adaptive states are unique. When the traits are 
fixed within populations, the typical tools of populational studies are unavailable. In humans, 
experimental methods such as surgical intervention or selective breeding are unethical (Ruse 
1979). As a result, many aspects of humans continue to be debated, such as the female orgasm, 
human language, or rape (Travis 2003; Lloyd 2005; Nielsen 2009; MacColl 2011). Adaptive 
studies of unique features are not impossible, as some have charged (see Durrant and Haig 
2001). It is simply that many sources of direct evidence will remain unavailable. To the extent 
that less information is available, in many cases it will continue to be hard to distinguish between 
different alternative explanations to decide which is the likeliest. By asking what information is 
ideally needed to generate a given explanation, a maximally robust explanation can be 
constructed. Because its history is so vexed and it is of such broad interest, we have focused on 
adaptation here. However, a similar search for the optimal combination of layers of direct 
evidence can be used to guide the effort to turn any evolutionary just-so story into a well-
supported explanation.  
 
EXTERNALIST VERSUS INTERNALIST JUST-SO STORIES 
The traditional perspective of the Modern Synthesis is that variation is ample and observed 
morphologies represent the winnowing effects of selection (Amundson 1994, Jablonka and Lamb 
2005). Because environmental factors “external” to the organism are viewed as determining 
which variants prosper, this adaptation-driven view is often referred to as externalism. In 
contrast, internalism is the notion that interactions between parts of developmental systems are 
such that developmental possibilities are severely limited and therefore the domain of action 
possible for natural selection is quite restricted (Alberch 1989). Up to now, we have focused on 
externalist just-so stories.  
However, internalist just-so stories are just as easy to concoct (Figure 2). Likewise, 
internalist explanations can be constructed just as robustly as externalist ones. In fact, because 
examining developmental potential is essential for testing adaptationist hypotheses (Table 5), and 
because ruling out an externalist explanation is essential for shoring up an internalist one, the 
externalist and internalist approaches are both necessarily built in to a maximally robust loopy 
explanation and really not separate perspectives at all (cf. Schwenk and Wagner 2004).  
Whether starting from an internalist or an externalist perspective, biologists test the 
developmental accessibility of apparently empty patches of morphospace (e.g. above and below 
the line in Figure 2) via a number of approaches (Olson 2012). Such studies include detailed 
studies of embryology and artificial selection (Bell 2008; Frankino et al. 2010; Vedel et al. 
2010). Comparative studies can pit the performance or fitness of species with different character 
states against each other in different selective contexts (Baum and Larson 1991; Larson and 
Losos 1996; Losos 2011). Finding that developmental possibilities are sufficiently wide as to 
permit many other possible trait relationships, and that the “empty space” morphologies are 
inferior in performance, are findings that help shore up the idea that the pattern is an adaptive 
one. Developmental potential is thus a central part of any adaptation based explanation. 
These detailed depictions of possible developmental variation, and study of the relative 
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performance of variation natural and constructed, helps overcome the constraint-adaptation 
dichotomy. A move away from a simple constraint-adaptation dichotomy is perhaps the most 
promising aspect of loopy explanations built on a correct selection of sources of evidence. 
Moving away from the dichotomy is in part desirable because the vagueness of the term 
“constraint” makes it of little use in evolutionary thinking (see the catalog of meanings in Olson 
2012). More importantly, the dichotomy is unacceptable as an explanatory formula because both 
selection and constraints, whatever the definition used, are involved in the generation of any 
given pattern in nature (Fusco 2001; West-Eberhard 2003; Schwenk and Wagner 2004; Minelli 
2009; Badyaev 2011). For example, while selection might cull from the possible, resulting in a 
narrow range of commonly observed morphologies (say in Figure 2), factors such as minimum 
developmentally possible cell dimensions can limit the domain of the possible (see for example 
Amundson 1994). As a result, it is meaningless to ask whether the pattern in Figure 2 is “caused 
by adaptation or constraint” because every pattern in the living world is the result of both, 
however “constraint” is defined. By showing the way explicitly away from this unsatisfactory 
dichotomy with clear questions and a battery of empirical tools, studies that draw on multiple 
layers of direct evidence provide ever more satisfactory explanations of organismal form. 
Recognizing the way that robust explanations are constructed also should improve public 
understanding of science.  
 
EMBRACING LOOPINESS: IMPROVING SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE AND THE COMMUNICATION OF 
EVOLUTION 
That inferences of adaptation are necessarily “loopy” helps reorient discussions of “circularity” 
in evolutionary biology. It sheds light on the long tradition of accusing the entire study of 
adaptation as resting on tautology, i.e. circular reasoning. A popular version of this criticism goes 
that natural selection is the survival of the fittest, and the fittest are those that survive. The 
phenomenon to be explained is part of the premises, thereby rendering the formulation circular 
(Peters 1976; Bowler, 1989). When the loopy structure of evolutionary explanation is 
recognized, the debate over adaptationism as a tautology appears to be predicated on the 
incorrect interpretation of “loops” as fatal flaws rather than natural and necessary. An 
explanation involving adaptation involves many more layers than just “fit” and “survival” (Hull 
1969). As in any evolutionary explanation, “circular” loops of reasoning are present, e.g. the 
form-function fit is explained by selection and that selection is identified as an important process 
because of the global form-function fit. A well-supported explanation gives abundant evidence to 
accept them (Figure 3). The situation in Figure 3B, even though it includes “loops,” is hardly a 
tautology. In fact, across evolutionary biology at large, most of the accusation of “circularity” 
that biologists sling at each other almost always simply refer to “loops” of reasoning in 
abductive/IBE/Bayesian reasoning (Table 3). 
Rather than accusing one another of circularity whenever “loops” are detected, biologists 
can more profitably discuss how rickety a reasoning loop is versus how well supported it might 
be, and what additional data would be desirable. In Table 3 the statements of Waterman (1962) 
and Tattersall and Eldredge (1977) are very close to the account offered here. Many of the other 
accusations of circularity in Table 3 bear reevaluating, to ask whether they might be reasonable 
"loopy" explanations that await testing via the accumulation of more layers of direct evidence, 
moving them from the situation in Figure 3A to that in Figure 3B. For example, Neal et al. 
(1998, Table 3) discussed ways that floral morphology, scent, and rewards fit with the pollinators 
that visit the flowers. They noted that “sophisticated” bees, understood as those with greater 
manipulation skills, learning ability, or sensory perception, are often said to pollinate more 
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complex and difficult to negotiate flowers. The problem is that some bees are identified as 
“sophisticated” precisely because they pollinate complex flowers. This reasoning certainly 
sounds circular. However, additional layers of direct evidence can be generated to see how well 
the explanations, assumptions and all, fit the observed patterns (see also Nielsen 2009; O’Malley 
2011). Neal et al. (1998) suggest that independent tests of learning ability of bees should be 
compared with floral complexity to see if there is a correspondence. Such studies could be 
conducted across species, within populations with floral variation, or even with artificially 
manipulated flowers. Any of these could potentially strengthen the sophisticated bee-complex 
flower hypothesis. Some examples might be more perniciously circular. Using the same 
assumptions to simulate data to validate a method built with those same assumptions might be 
such a case (Sage et al. 1993 in Table 3). By recognizing the loopy structure of evolutionary 
explanation, biologists can more effectively guide efforts to distinguish flawed reasoning from 
legitimately loopy explanations.  
Lack of clarity regarding the loopy structure of adaptationist explanations not only affects 
science but also the way biologists present evolutionary biology to the public at large. That 
scientists lack clarity regarding the structure of the explanations that they themselves strive to 
construct has exacerbated public misunderstanding of how science works. Assurances that 
science produces deductive certainties has in many ways played into the hands of critics, such as 
advocates of intelligent design (Oakley 2010; Lancaster 2011 Barnes and Church 2013). Public 
demands for “proof” and criticism of “circularity” in debates over evolution (and others such as 
global climate change) almost always fail to take into account the loopy nature of the legitimate 
explanations in these fields. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Studies of adaptation would necessarily seem to require the sort of loopy reasoning depicted in 
Figure 3B (Holcomb 1996). Recognizing how adaptationist explanations are structured in actual 
practice helps give clarity to problems that have plagued biology, such as debates over 
tautology/circularity, and resolve false conflicts, such as the mutual scorn that often characterizes 
the adherents of the comparative, population/ quantitative genetics, and optimality approaches 
(e.g. Calow 1987; Leroi et al. 1994; cf. Zimmermann, 1983 p. 2 with Haberlandt, 1914 p. 12). 
Instead, as providers of complementary sources of direct evidence, no single approach has a 
monopoly on tests of adaptation. An understanding of the real, loopy structure of evolutionary 
explanation encourages biologists to discuss truly substantial issues awaiting attention, such as 
how to identify the population of hypotheses from which to select the “best” explanation, how 
scientists know the best explanation when they see it, or how best to weave disparate sources of 
evidence into a single explanation. By accepting that studies of adaptation require multiples 
types of direct evidence, evolutionary biologists can improve current research practice by 
designing a compelling and long-overdue integration of comparative, populational, and 
optimality approaches.  
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TABLE 1 
The three principal approaches for studying adaptation, some typically cited advantages and 
disadvantages, and the key assumptions that give each method its relevance to evolutionary 
biology in general 
 
Definition Advantages Disadvantages key assumption 
Comparative
/ 
convergence 
The convergence on 
similar morphologies in 
similar selective 
contexts from ancestors 
with different states 
suggests adaptation 
Studies species in nature 
that are the descendants 
of natural evolutionary 
processes; examines 
patterns applicable across 
evolutionarily relevant 
time spans and many 
species 
Does not examine 
fitness or heritability 
directly; often relies on 
ancestral character 
state reconstructions or 
assumptions of tempo 
and mode that are 
impossible to test 
Comparative 
patterns are 
produced by 
population level 
processes, involving 
developmental 
variation, 
heritability, and 
differential fitness 
Populational  Studies the raw material 
of selection directly, i.e. 
fitness/ peformance 
differences associated 
with heritable within-
species trait variation 
The focal approach for 
directly examining 
intraspecific variation, 
heritability, and the 
fitness impact of this 
variation 
Examines relatively 
minor characters that 
have not gone to 
fixation; extrapolation 
of results to many 
species and large time 
scales unproven  
Population-level 
processes are 
isomorphic with the 
factors shaping the 
entire diversity of 
life  
Optimality Predicts the 
configuration(s) 
maximizing a 
performance/ fitness 
criterion given general 
biophysical principles 
and a set of competing 
considerations; 
concordance between 
model and nature 
suggests adaptation  
Based on models that 
explicitly incorporate 
competing demands on 
an organism; even a lack 
of model-nature 
correspondence is useful 
because it highlights 
elements that need to be 
considered; explicitly 
includes fitness/ 
performance indices 
The process of 
selection of variables is 
often criticized; in 
addition, there is no 
directive emerging 
from nature to indicate 
where the cutoff in fit 
between nature and the 
model should be taken 
as congruent with the 
model or not 
Adaptation is the 
only plausible 
explanation for trait 
optimality 
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TABLE 2 
Major types of inference 
Type of 
inference 
A conclusion is correct 
because… 
Formal representation* Example kind of 
explanation 
Deduction If the premises are true, the 
conclusion is true 
If A then B. 
A. 
_____________ 
Then B. 
If it rains the floor is wet. 
It rains. 
___________  
The floor is wet. 
Pattern 
Induction Numerous observations from 
numerous sources such as 
experimental results, statistical 
analyses, previous 
information, etc. strengthen 
the cogency of a conclusion 
If A then probably B. 
A. 
______________ 
______________ 
Then probably B. 
80% of the time, when it rains, the 
floor gets wet. 
It rains. 
______________ 
______________ 
There is an 80% chance that the 
floor is wet. 
Pattern/ 
Loopy 
Abduction Theory and available evidence 
make it likely that a 
conclusion is correct 
A. 
If B obtained then A would 
be a matter of course. 
B. 
______________ 
______________ 
Then A. 
The floor is wet. 
If it rained, then the floor being wet 
would be a matter of course. 
It rained. 
______________ 
______________ 
Rain is likely the reason why the 
floor is wet. 
Loopy 
     
Bayesianism Belief in a conclusion 
increases as more and more 
relevant evidence is gathered 
P(A|B)=P(B|A)*P(A) 
P(B) 
I believe that it rained (A). 
The floor is wet (B). 
Then my belief that it rained has 
been increased given the available 
evidence 
P(A|B)>P(A). 
  
Loopy 
* Following convention, deductive inferences are characterized by the premises and the 
conclusion being separated by a single line, to indicate that they are “truth preserving,” i.e. that 
given the truth of the premises the conclusion will be true as well. By convention two lines 
indicate non-truth preserving arguments, such as those that are upheld by probability and loopy 
reasoning. Inductive arguments are not necessarily probabilistic as there are many different ways 
to compute the strength of the conclusion. Bayesianism is included to exemplify a popular form 
of reasoning using probabilities, but the same example can be generalized to other statistical 
procedures, for example to Neyman-Pearson’s hypothesis testing. In Bayesianism, beliefs are 
quantified in probabilistic terms. P(A|B) is read as “the probability of A given B”.   
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TABLE 3 
Examples of the ways that biologists discuss circularity in evolutionary biology and especially in 
the study of adaptation 
authors Year Quotes 
Waterman 1962 
“…circularity is inherent in the methodology of science since one must proceed from data to 
construct or model and thence back to new data or from model to data and back to model again. In a 
well-developed science a multiplicity of such intersecting circular pathways form a coherent system 
of consistent relations” p. 549 
van der 
Steen and 
Boontje 
1973 
A critique of the view that definitions of "homology" in terms of common ancestry represent 
circularity (homology is manifest as similarity due to common ancestry; common ancestry is 
inferred due to similarity) 
Peters 1976 
Because stressful habitats are identified by low species diversity, “‘the stability- time hypothesis’ 
[which specifies that non-stressful habitats give rise to higher species diversity] cannot be accepted 
as a scientific theory as it now stands.” p. 10 
Raven 1976 It is circular to infer homology between chromosomes from pairing experiments, and explain pairing because of homology 
Tattersall 
and 
Eldredge 
1977 “…much of the reasoning that goes into [phylogeny] construction is circular: the many elements involved feed back upon each other in an extremely intricate way.” p. 205  
Stevens  1980 
It is circular to use distributions to inform the reconstruction of the phylogenetic relationships 
between species and then make inferences regarding the evolution of distributions on the basis of 
the resulting phylogeny (see also Schaefer and Lauder 1986) 
Tyler 1986 
“…according to Popper, the difficulty the historical sciences face, whether the biological sciences 
or the social sciences, is that the systems they study can only be identified through change. And yet 
it is the changes themselves, rather than the systems, which are the main object of interest. Hence 
there is an unavoidable circularity in the historical sciences.” p. 726 
Landres et 
al. 1988 
“…circularity arises when using indicators to predict habitat conditions, because the initial choice 
of the indicator depended on those habitat conditions” p. 320 
Sage et al.  1993 
“Another approach [to test the accuracy of methods of reconstructing the evolutionary relationships 
between species] has been to use computer simulations to generate evolutionary divergence in sets 
of genes. These simulated data can be used to evaluate the efficacy of various computer algorithms 
to reproduce the simulated genetic history. Unfortunately, the assumptions used to simulate the data 
can often be matched almost exactly by the assumptions of the algorithm used.” p. 546 
Blackstone 1995 
“Further, constructing a hypothetical ancestral form by assembling suites of shared primitive 
characters introduces an element of circularity and can have unintended results such as erecting 
paraphyletic taxa (e.g., see discussion of the "hypothetical ancestral mollusk" in Brusca and Brusca 
1990).” p. 786 
Neal et al.  1998 
More sophisticated bees are said to be found on more complex flowers. The argument sometimes 
becomes circular because the bees are often classified by the flowers they visit, rather than by 
experimental tests of learning ability 
Pennington 
et al. 2006 
“…studies [of the ages of clades] that rely too heavily on single geological calibrations have been 
criticized for their circularity” p. 607 
Waters and 
Craw 2006 
New Zealand inherited its flora and fauna when the great southern landmass Gondwana broke up; 
this is inferred from NZ sharing lineages with other southern landmasses. The similarity is 
explained by the breakup, the breakup inferred from the sharing of lineages 
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TABLE 4 
How biologists classify evolutionary inference 
Author year 
Evolutionary biology (mostly the study of 
adaptation) is… Cites 
Ghiselin 1966 “obviously hypothetico-deductive” Popper 1962 
Medawar 1967 hypothetico-deductive  
Ghiselin 1969 
Biology…is a hypothetico-deductive, predictive, 
deterministic, and nomothetic science (p. xiii 
1984 edition) Popper 1965, etc. 
Williams 1970 deductive  
Platnick and 
Gaffney 1978 hypothetico-deductive Popper 1972, 1976 
Gould 1980 
abductive, defined as "the creative grabbing and 
amalgamation of disparate concepts into bold 
ideas that could be formulated for testing" mentions Peirce 
Jaksić 1981 hypothetico-deductive Popper 1959 
Mayr 1982 hypothetico-deductive 
Ghiselin 1969 among others, 
mentions Hempel and Popper 
Fisher 1985 hypothetico-deductive, also "strong inference" Platt 1964 
Calow 1987 hypothetico-deductive  
Bock  1988, 1994 deductive-nomological and historical-narrative  
Bowler 1989 hypothetico-deductive  
Murray  1992 hypothetico-deductive Newton 1729; Popper 1968, 1972 
Thornhill 1995 hypothetico-deductive Hempel 1966 
Anelli, 
Eldredge 2006 hypothetico-deductive  
Ayala 2009 hypothetico-deductive Popper 1959, 1963; Hempel 1965 
McKnight 2009 "hypothesis-driven with inductive inquiry" Ayala 2009 
Sulloway 2009 hypothetico-deductive Ghiselin 1969 
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TABLE 5 
Comparative, populational, and optimality approaches provide complementary sources of direct 
evidence regarding hypotheses of adaptation, with none having a more privileged perspective 
than any other 
 
comparative studies populational studies optimality studies 
variants present in 
ancestral populations no direct evidence no direct evidence no direct evidence 
variants were heritable in 
ancestral populations no direct evidence no direct evidence no direct evidence 
variants differed in fitness 
in ancestral populations no direct evidence no direct evidence no direct evidence 
variants differed in 
performance in ancestral 
populations 
no direct evidence no direct evidence no direct evidence 
intrapopulational variants 
currently 
produced/producible 
no direct evidence 
study variation across 
populations within a species, 
additive genetic variance, 
etc. 
no direct evidence 
intrapopulational variants 
are currently heritable no direct evidence 
quantitative genetic 
measurements of heritability, 
etc. 
no direct evidence 
intrapopulational variants 
vary in fitness no direct evidence 
studies of survivorship, 
mating success, fecundity, 
response to selection 
no direct evidence 
population-level processes 
plausibly produce 
interspecific patterns 
cross species organism-
environment or trait-trait 
(allometry) relationships 
no direct evidence no direct evidence 
Difference in performace 
understandable based on 
functional generalizations, 
engineering principles, etc. 
no direct evidence no direct evidence 
the optimality approach 
broadly construed is required 
to deploy thinking in terms 
of functional generalizations 
variants fill morphospace 
evenly or there are 
constraints that may lead 
to patterns of trait 
association 
studies of how species fill 
morphospace, incl. 
comparative embryology 
studies of how variants 
natural and induced, 
including teratologies, fill 
morphospace; artificial 
selection  
predict the range of 
morphologies that should be 
observed; may predict 
“holes” in morphospace 
trait (quasi-) independence 
(i.e. the trait is a “part” 
that can be subject to 
selection 
study how traits vary 
independently across species 
study how traits vary 
independently in ontogeny, 
G matrix  
explicit focus on functionally 
coupled and competing traits 
current utility/function compare performance of different character states 
compare fitness of variants in 
a population 
generate explicit 
expectations regarding 
performance differences 
between variants 
arose for its current 
function in its current 
selective context 
compare performance of 
apomorphic state in current 
selective context with 
plesiomorphic state 
no direct evidence no direct evidence 
Following the notion of adaptation of Gould and Vrba (1982) and Larson and Losos (1996); 
other definitions of adaptation will lead to different sets of criteria 
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FIGURE 1. CIRCULARITY AND THE GIRAFFE NECK JUST-SO STORY 
Giraffes in present day populations use their long necks to reach leaves from tall trees. The 
presence of long necks is explained as the result of unobserved and unobservable selection in 
ancestral populations in the distant past. It is assumed that there was once heritable variation in 
short-necked ancestral giraffe populations, and that this variation had fitness consequences. 
Specifically, longer-necked individuals were favored because of greater access to food. This 
entire selective scenario, variation, heritability, fitness, and all, is accepted as true because 
giraffes today use their necks to reach food from tall trees. The selective scenario in turn explains 
why girafffes have long necks. An adaptationist scenario with little direct evidence beyond the 
pattern to be explained is known as a just-so story.  
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FIGURE 2. ADAPTATIONIST EXPLANATIONS AND CIRCULARITY, GENERAL CASE 
Points on the graphs refer to mean species trait values, and the line an allometric regression fit. 
The "scaling as adaptation" view sees the entire space defined by the mean values as potentially 
accessible in ontogeny, but that the configurations corresponding to the empty spaces are 
eliminated by selection. The view of scaling as reflecting limited developmental potential sees 
allometry as the manifestation of a lack of developmental alternatives. Both perspectives make 
untested assumptions: adaptationist reasoning regarding empty spaces is shown above the scaling 
line, and thinking in terms of developmental potential below. Both loops can be read starting at 
a. or b., i.e. “a. This space is empty. Therefore, b. these morphologies must be developmentally 
possible but of low fitness,” or “b. These morphologies must be developmentally inaccessible, 
therefore a. this space is empty.” In both cases a. is used to infer b. which in turn is inferred 
based on a. This example is a comparative one, but similar “loops” of reasoning are found in 
population and optimality methods as well. The means to strengthen these “circular” inferences 
is via additional layers of evidence (see Figure 3).  
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FIGURE 3. THE “LOOPY” STRUCTURE OF ADAPTATIONIST EXPLANATIONS: GENERAL CASE 
A. It is easy to see that, when very little evidence is available, adaptive explanations of a given 
pattern have an element of “circularity” or loopy nature. This structure involves loops of 
reasoning in which, of the possible explanations, e.g. adaptation, limited developmental 
potential, drift/chance etc., adaptation is chosen as seeming the most likely. Declaring a given 
pattern as the result of adaptation immediately implies assuming many things about variation, 
heritability, performance, and fitness. These assumptions are accepted given how well they 
would explain the data if they were true. Biologists often call these adaptive explanations “just-
so stories” and demand additional evidence. B. The “loopy” structure of inferences of adaptation 
persists even when abundant direct evidence is available. Inferences of adaptation with diverse 
sources of direct evidence seem as solid as any in any branch of science. For example, the 
presence of fins in aquatic animals seems certain to involve adaptation (Figure 4). However, 
these inferences still require acceptance of assumptions based on how well they would explain 
the data if they were true. Adding more layers of direct evidence diminishes the relative 
importance of “loops” of reasoning, but they never disappear entirely.  
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FIGURE 4. THE “LOOPY” STRUCTURE OF ADAPTATIONIST EXPLANATIONS: THE FINS AND FUSIFORM 
BODIES OF AQUATIC ANIMALS 
That the possession of fins and a streamlined shape represent the effects of selection in an 
aquatic environment seems certain. This explanation is so solid because there is an abundance of 
evidence from across the three main adaptationist disciplinary approaches. There is the 
comparative observation that unrelated aquatic animals, such as squid, whales, fish, and 
eurypterids, have or had streamlined bodies and fins. From a populational point of view, it is 
clear that there is heritable variation in many body and fin traits, and that this variation is 
associated with performance differences, as in domestic goldfish breeds. That selection on these 
traits can be operative now strongly suggests that it also did in unobserved ancestral populations. 
Moreover, optimality models based on fluid mechanics illuminate the biomechanical basis for 
performance differences between variants. But no matter how much direct evidence accumulates, 
some reasoning “loops” remain. At some point in the distant past, there were presumably 
populations without these traits, and in which they arose, varied, and were favored. These 
ancestral populations are impossible to observe. The assumptions regarding their characteristics 
are accepted because they would explain the data so well if they were true. 
